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JOB MARKET SIGNALING OF RELATIVE




This paper considers a matching model of the labor market where workers, who have private
information on their quality, signal to ﬁrms that also differ in quality. Signals allow assortative
matching in which the highest-quality workers send the highest signals and are hired by the best
ﬁrms. Matching is considered both when wages are rigid (nontransferable utility) and when they
are fully ﬂexible (transferable utility). In both cases, equilibrium strategies and payoffs depend on
the distributions of worker and ﬁrm types. This is in contrast to separating equilibria of the standard
model,whichdonotrespondtochangesinsupplyordemand.Withstickywages,despiteincomplete
information, equilibrium investment in education by low-ability workers can be inefﬁciently low,
and this distortion can become worse in a more competitive environment. In contrast, with ﬂexible
wages, greater competition improves efﬁciency. (JEL: C72, C78, D82)
1. Introduction
It is now more than 30 years since Spence (1973) introduced the idea that investment
in education could be undertaken as a signal to prospective employers. Although
Spence’s classic work provided many important insights, it arguably provides an
incomplete picture of the labor market phenomena it set out to model. In particular,
whereas workers differ in quality, ﬁrms are in effect identical and offer the same
wages. This ignores the role of educational achievement in effectively allocating
heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs. A modiﬁed model with differentiated
employers could also resolve another known problem with the Spence model. There,
in any separating equilibrium, strategies and outcomes (such as wages) do not respond
to changes in the relative frequency of high- and low-quality workers. That is, the
wages of skilled workers are oddly unresponsive to changes in the supply of either
The editor in charge of this paper was Patrick Bolton.
Acknowledgements: This paper arose from joint research with Tatiana Kornienko on the economics of
relative concerns. I would like to thank Tatiana, Tilman B¨ orgers, Simon Clark, Melvyn Coles, Benny
Moldovanu, Michael Peters, Andrew Postlewaite, J´ ozsef S´ akovics, Larry Samuelson, Jeroen Swinkels,
and Jonathan Thomas for helpful discussions. My apologies to Professors Becker and Spence. Errors
remain my own. I acknowledge support from the Economic and Social Research Council, award reference
RES-000-27-0065.
E-mail address: E.Hopkins@ed.ac.uk
Journal of the European Economic Association April 2012 10(2):290–322
c   2011 by the European Economic Association DOI: 10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.01047.xHopkins Job Market Signaling of Relative Position 291
skilled or unskilled labor. In contrast, in the model presented in this paper, workers
compete for high-quality jobs that are in scarce supply. As a result, the quality
and quantity of workers and the relative supply of jobs all matter for equilibrium
outcomes.
This type of model is important because many real-world labor markets,
particularly for professionals, clearly have vertical differentiation on both sides of
the market. There is careful effort devoted by both sides to ensuring a good match
between employer and employee, and intense competition for high-ranked employers
and for star candidates. This strongly resembles Becker’s (1973) marriage matching
model, which allows for differences in quality on both sides of the market. However,
the literature on matching has assumed that employment decisions are made on the
basis of the intrinsic characteristics of candidates. This ignores the clear competition
between candidates in educational achievement in order to achieve top jobs. Equally,
while the literature on tournaments in labor economics goes back to Lazear and
Rosen (1981), tournaments are usually assumed to be internal to a ﬁrm. In contrast,
here I look at what I call a matching tournament model of a labor market in which
agents make an investment decision before participating in a frictionless matching
market. If that investment is a signal of otherwise unobservable ability, then matching





situations: when wages are sticky and when they are fully ﬂexible. Workers undertake
visible investment in education to signal underlying heterogeneous ability. Employers
are also vertically differentiated, but this is observable. In a separating equilibrium,
there is positive assortative matching in which high-quality workers send high signals
and are matched with high-quality ﬁrms. Equilibrium strategies and payoffs depend
on the distributions of characteristics of both ﬁrms and workers. This is shown to
hold even when wages are determined by bargaining between workers and ﬁrms
(transferable utility), provided the stronger assumption is imposed that workers and
ﬁrms are complements in production. That is, there is a dependence on demand and
supply that is absent in Spence’s original model. An increase in the quantity or quality
of labor or a decrease in the quality of jobs increases the competitiveness of the labor
market.Understickywages,thisleadstohigherinvestmentbyhightypes,butlowtypes
are discouraged and invest less. In a more difﬁcult situation, low-ranking workers have
little prospect of a good job and so have a lower incentive to compete. With ﬂexible
wages, both investment and wages fall at each level of ability and wages fall for each
level of investment.
Signaling models are well known for generating inefﬁciently high investment in
signals. But in the current matching tournament environment, this is married with a
hold-up problem: workers may not take into account the beneﬁt of their investment
to potential partners and hence invest inefﬁciently little. When wages are ﬂexible, the
signaling effect is stronger and investment is everywhere too high. However, when292 Journal of the European Economic Association
wages are not ﬂexible, the hold-up effect dominates for low-ability workers, who will
invest below the social optimum. In contrast, high achievers can overinvest.
Even more interesting is how the level of efﬁciency responds to changes, such
as an increase in quantity or quality of labor supply. Increased competition leads to
lowerandthusmoreefﬁcientinvestmentunderﬂexiblewages.Butwhenwagesarenot
fully ﬂexible, increased competition makes investment less efﬁcient as it discourages
low-ability workers, who already invest too little. If one takes the US labor market
to be closer to the ﬂexible model and European markets to be closer to the less
ﬂexible, the two different forms of matching tournament offer a way of comparing the
differing effect of demand and supply shocks on these different labor markets. This
analysis suggests that, when wages are not fully ﬂexible, there is a serious poverty
trap at the bottom end of the distribution. Greater competition discourages rather than
encourages low-ability workers to invest in human capital, and decreases rather than
increases efﬁciency.
This is not the case in the classic signaling model of Spence (1973), or
its generalization to a continuous type space (see Spence 1974; Mailath 1987).
Speciﬁcally, in a separating equilibrium of the classic model, a signaler’s equilibrium
payoffsaredeterminedbytheabsolutelevelofherproductivity—forexample,sheends
up being paid her marginal product—and this is independent of market conditions.
Further, the type of signal sent does not determine which kind of job is obtained with
which type of employer. This is despite the fact that educational achievement clearly
has this allocative function in real-world labor markets.1 Of course, there are other
equilibria in Spence’s model. For instance, in a pooling equilibrium, the wage paid
is equal to average worker quality and depends on the distribution of ability. This
implies that if worker quality rises then so do wages. However, it is shown that, in the
separating outcome considered here, an increase in worker quality causes wages to fall
at each ability level and for each level of investment. Pooling equilibria also exist in
the current model but are effectively no different from pooling outcomes in the Spence
model.
In the separating equilibrium of the model presented here, a signaler’s payoff
will depend on which type of job she is able to obtain. High-quality jobs are in
ﬁxed supply and are allocated to the most successful candidates. An agent’s job
market outcome will therefore depend on her rank in the distribution of types in the
population.2 Furthermore, changes in the distribution of jobs available or in quality
of other workers will change her competitive position and hence how much she must
signal to communicate successfully that she is a leading candidate. The classic model
can be derived as a special case of our model simply by setting the two distributions on
either side of the market to be identical. Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992, 2001)
1. Strangely, more has been written on how conspicuous consumption signals suitability to potential
social partners (Pesendorfer 1995; Rege 2008).
2. An intriguing aspect of this model is that, because equilibrium utility will be increasing in one’s rank,
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pioneered the analysis of matching tournaments but concentrated on this case.3 The
comparativestaticsresultsinthispaperareobtainedbychangingonedistributionwhile
holding the other constant, something clearly not possible when they are constrained
to be equal.
This paper looks at labor market matching under two differing assumptions: ﬁrst
with constraints on wage setting and second when wages are ﬂexible. This difference
corresponds to the distinction between nontransferable utility (NTU) and transferable




many economists, the NTU matching tournament may prove a better ﬁt for some real-
world matching markets. For example, Bulow and Levin (2006) observe that wages
paid for medical residents are impersonal. That is, they are set before the labor market
commences and are not sensitive to the individual characteristics of the candidate who
is hired (but vary across hiring institutions). In Europe the situation is often even more
extreme: in most equivalent professional labor markets, wages are set at the national
level and so there is no variation at all. For example, within most European countries,
each university will pay new faculty the same starting salary.
One might well think that wage rigidity is the source of the positional effects
found in matching tournaments, where high-ranking workers earn rents from their
high relative position. Imagine that the quality of workers is poor; the best of that poor
bunch would get the best job even if of low quality in absolute terms. In contrast, if
wages were ﬂexible (the TU case), then one might think that any such positional rents
would be bargained away: low-quality workers would be offered low wages. In the
end, just as in the classical models, workers would be paid their product. It is shown in
Section3thatthisisnotthecase.Iftheadditionalassumptionismadethattheattributes
of workers and ﬁrms are strict complements in production, then equilibrium wages,
signaling, and welfare all depend on the distributions of characteristics of both ﬁrms
and workers. Even with fully ﬂexible wages, earnings and investment in education by
workers of a given ability level will depend on the level of competition from other
workers.
Matching tournaments were introduced by Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992,
1995). This paper is one of the ﬁrst to look at comparative statics in such models.
Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009) recently and independently have also examined
the comparative statics of matching tournaments. Their work is innovative in its
development of techniques to deal with a ﬁnite number of participants (and taking
the limit as the number approaches inﬁnity). However, importantly, they assume that
signaling is a pure waste and therefore always exceeds the socially optimal level. In
contrast, onefocusoftheanalysishereisthepossibility ofunderinvestmentthatcanbe
compounded by greater competition. Further, here there is a treatment of both TU and
3. They also concentrate on situations of complete information, although a brief treatment of signaling
appears in Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1995).294 Journal of the European Economic Association
NTU in the context of a labor market, which permits the analysis of how differences
in wage ﬂexibility affect signaling behaviour. In contrast, Hoppe et al. concentrate on
NTU matching in a relatively abstract environment.
Finally,whileallocationistheprimaryconcernoftheliteraturesontheassignment
of workers to jobs and on matching, it has always been assumed that matching occurs
on the basis of intrinsic characteristics rather than on choices made by participants.
That is why in pure matching models, although similar comparative statics exercises
are possible (Costrell and Loury 2004), they have nothing to say about competition
for matches or workers’ investment decisions and whether the resulting investment
is efﬁcient. In summary, standard signaling models capture competition between
workers but lack sensible comparative statics; assignment and matching models allow
comparative statics but lack competition. This paper shows that matching tournaments
incorporate the best features of both classes of model.
2. Matching Tournaments
This section outlines a model of a matching tournament, where the prizes of a
standard tournament are replaced by matching opportunities. I have in mind three
prime examples: students competing for places at college, the marriage market, and
the market for jobs. For example, students in the ﬁnal year of graduate school seek
faculty positions at universities. I will use the terminology of this last case and talk
about workers and ﬁrms. I also make the simplifying assumption that workers have
a common ordering over potential jobs. That is, in (say) the academic job market,
all graduating students agree on the best university position, the second best, and so
on. Employers all agree that they would like to hire the most able candidate, but the
ability of candidates is not observable. Hence, potential employers can only infer the
ability of workers from an investment decision in education, made before matching.
We shall look at equilibria in which all employers rank all workers in terms of this
investment. In this paper, the employers have no investment decision of their own to
make. Indeed, one can also consider, as a special case of the model, situations such
as sports tournaments where the ﬁrms are only inanimate monetary prizes, which are
assigned to candidates according to their performance.
The model can be viewed as an incomplete information version of the model
introduced by Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992, 1995, 1998, 2001), hereafter
CMP. However, we generalize their model to allow for different distributions of
characteristics on the two sides of the market. This will allow both for a richer model
and for comparative statics analysis of the effect of changes in those distributions. This
generalization also distinguishes our model from standard signaling models.
There are two populations of agents: workers and ﬁrms. Each population is taken
to be a continuum and each is differentiated in quality, with a worker’s type or
ability z being distributed on [z, ¯ z] with z ≥ 0 according to the distribution G(z). This
distributionistwicedifferentiablewithstrictlypositiveboundeddensityg(z).Firmsare
also differentiated in quality s, which has the twice differentiable distribution functionHopkins Job Market Signaling of Relative Position 295
H(s)o n[
¯
s, ¯ s] and has strictly positive bounded density h(s) (in the case of a sports
tournament, H(s) is just the distribution of prize money).
There are two principal differences between ﬁrms and workers. First, the type of a
worker is her private information, whereas the types of ﬁrms are common knowledge.
Second, workers must make an investment decision before attempting to match with
ﬁrms. In particular, they must choose a visible level of investment x from the positive
real line [0, ∞). Following Spence, this could be a choice of education level. A
worker’s type z is usual interpreted as her ability and is positively related to the
worker’s productivity. After the choice of investment, matching will take place, with
one worker matching with each ﬁrm. A match between a worker of type z investing x
with a ﬁrm of type s will produce output π(z, s, x), where π(·) is a smooth increasing
function. As we shall see, stable matching is positive and assortative. That is, workers
with high z will match with ﬁrms with high s.
In this matching tournament, an equilibrium will have two components: a strategy
for the workers x(z) that gives the choice of investment as a function of worker type,
and a matching scheme that assigns workers to ﬁrms. For an equilibrium, the matching
scheme must be stable given observable investment and the strategy x(z).4 Second,
no worker can have an incentive to deviate given the strategies of her fellow workers
and the matching scheme in place during the matching phase. The equilibrium is like
that of CMP (2001), a hybrid. The second stage of the tournament is treated as a
cooperative game, in that it requires stability in the matching process.5 However, the
choice of investments in the ﬁrst stage is non-cooperative. We call such an equilibrium
symmetric if all workers use the same strategy, that is, the same mapping x(z) from
type to investment.
The equilibrium will be constructed as follows. First, I show that, if there is
complete separation in choice of investment, then the only stable matching in the
second stage is positive and assortative. Second, moving backwards to the ﬁrst stage,
I show that there exists a unique separating strategy from which no worker wishes to
deviate, given the behavior of other workers and the anticipated positive assortative
matching.
Recall the assumption that the product from a match is π(z, s, x). Assume further
that (a) π(·) is twice continuously differentiable, and (b) π(·) is (weakly) increasing in
all its arguments. Within this general framework, we can consider two special cases.
Story A: Valueless Signaling. Here the observable action x is itself of no use
to ﬁrms. But, it may serve as a signal of a worker’s type z, and the proﬁt of ﬁrms
is increasing in the type of their match. For example, as in Spence’s (1973) classic
model, education may signal ability. The product of a match is strictly increasing in
the worker’s type: πz(z, s, x) > 0 and πx(z, s, x) = 0.
4. In a fully separating equilibrium, the matching will also be stable ex post. That is, ﬁrms will not regret
their match once the type of the worker has been revealed.
5. Followingtheliteratureoncooperativematching,Ilookatstablematchings,andnottheprocedurethat
produces them. However, there are ways of modeling the matching process non-cooperatively, admittedly
assuming away frictions, that would generate the same results; see CMP (1998) or Niederle and Yariv
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StoryB:ConstructiveSignaling.Heretheobservableactionxincreasestheproduct
of a match. However, the product also depends on a worker’s unobservable type z.F o r
example, education may increase human capital as well as signal ability. The product
of a match is strictly increasing in both a worker’s type and her investment: πx(z, s, x)
> 0 and πz(z, s, x) > 0.
In this section, I consider preferences under nontransferable utility (transferable




ﬂexibility under TU makes stable matching harder to achieve, because alternative
matches are easier to negotiate. Consequently, for positive assortative matching to
hold, stronger assumptions are required than with NTU.
Let us assume, similarly to Spence (1974), that utility for workers is of the
following form:
U(z,s,x) = b(z,s,x) − c(z,x), (1)
where b denotes beneﬁts and c costs. Costs will be increasing in investment x but
decreasing in a worker’s ability z. More precisely, assume the following properties:
(i) b(·) and c(·) are twice continuously differentiable;
(ii) bs(z, s, x) > 0, bz(z, s, x) ≥ 0, and bx(z, s, x) ≥ 0; (monotonicity of beneﬁts);
(iii) cx(z, x) > 0 and cz(z, x) < 0 (monotonicity of costs);
(iv) bzx(z, s, x) ≥ 0, bzs(z, s, x) ≥ 0, and czx(z, x) < 0 (complementarity);
(v) bxx(z, s, x) ≤ 0 and cxx(z, x) > 0 (concavity).
These assumptions are compatible with the two principal stories used within the
NTU literature. First, if we interpret the ﬁrm’s type s as its level of prestige, we could
have b(z,s,x) = ˆ w + s. That is, the beneﬁt from the job is a ﬁxed wage ˆ w plus its
prestige s.7 Second, taking s to be a productive asset, such as the ﬁrm’s existing human
or physical capital, some form of wage inﬂexibility would justify b(z, s, x) = απ(z,
s, x) for some α ∈ (0, 1). Social conventions or legal constraints ﬁx wages as a ﬁxed
proportion of the product of a match. Firms receive the product π(·) from a match, less
wages.8 Thus ﬁrms, in their choice of worker, simply prefer the one who generates the
highest product. That is, the proﬁts of ﬁrms are strictly increasing in z ( S t o r yA )o ri n
both x and z (Story B).
Following CMP (1992, 1998), a matching is a function φ: [0, 1] → [0, 1] such
that a worker with rank G(zi) is matched with a ﬁrm of rank H(sj), φ(G(zi)) = H(sj)
6. Legros and Newman (2007) consider matching in the intermediate case where the degree of
transferability is a variable.
7. For example, academic wages in some European countries are ﬁxed by national agreement. Since all
universities pay the same, candidates simply prefer to be employed by the most prestigious institution.
8. Implicitly it is also assumed that money wages paid to a worker by a ﬁrm are always less than the
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∈ [0, 1]. The matching function φ is measure-preserving and one-to-one on φ([0, 1]).
That is, for all measurable subsets A⊂ [0, 1], φ−1(A) is measurable and λ(φ−1(A)) =
λ(A), where λ denotes Lebesgue measure. A matching is stable if there does not exist
i  = i  ∈ [0, 1] such that φ(i )Piφ(i) and iP φ(i )i , where P denotes “preferred to”, and
both preferences hold strictly.
The ﬁrst condition is the equivalent in a continuum to the assumption with ﬁnite
numbers that exactly one worker is matched to one ﬁrm. It is stated in terms of the
types—ﬁrm quality s and worker ability z—to ensure that matching is feasible. The
secondisthestabilitycondition,standardinmostmatchingproblems,thatrequiresthat
matches made are not subject to unraveling in the sense that it should not be possible
to ﬁnd a worker and a ﬁrm who would prefer to match with each other in place of
their current matches. The main issue here is that a ﬁrm must choose a worker on
the basis of visible investment x, because her type z is hidden. We make the standard
assumption that ﬁrms’ beliefs must be consistent with equilibrium strategies. The case
on which we focus is where the workers’ equilibrium strategy x(z) is strictly increasing
and hence separating. Then, ﬁrms must believe that a higher investment implies higher
ability. Thus, under Story A or Story B, a ﬁrm will prefer worker i over worker j if
and only if xi > xj. Lastly, workers’ utility is strictly increasing in ﬁrm type s which is
public information, thus a worker prefers ﬁrm i over ﬁrm j if and only if si > sj.
Supposeforthemomentthatthereexistsasymmetricequilibriumstrategyx(z)that
is differentiable and strictly increasing (we will go on to show that such an equilibrium
exists). Let us aggregate all the investment decisions of the workers into a distribution
summarized by a distribution function F(x). A strictly increasing symmetric strategy
impliesthat,inequilibrium,anagentoftypezi whoproducesx(zi)wouldhaveaposition
in the distribution of investment F(x(zi)) equal to his rank G(zi) in the distribution of
ability. This enables the ﬁrms to infer which worker is in fact the most able. This
in turn allows the matches to be made through the following assortative matching




outlined here is stable. That is, we can ﬁnd no worker and ﬁrm who would both prefer
each other in place of their current match.9
LEMMA 1. Suppose all workers adopt a symmetric strictly increasing strategy x(z).
Then the only stable matching the assortative matching, such that a worker of type
zi ∈ [z, ¯ z] with investment xi = x(zi) has a match of type si, where
G(zi) = F(xi) = φ (G(zi)) = H(si). (2)
9. Results of this type go back to Becker (1973). See Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1995), Fern´ andez
and Gal´ ı (1999) for a tournament approach similar to that employed here. Eeckhout (2000) and Legros
and Newman (2007) ﬁnd conditions under which positive assortative matching is the only stable matching
scheme.298 Journal of the European Economic Association
We now derive a symmetric equilibrium strategy for the workers. Suppose that
all agents adopt a strictly increasing differentiable strategy x(z). Then the equilibrium
relationship (2) implies that we can deﬁne the function
S(z) = H−1(G(z)); (3)
this gives for a worker of type z his equilibrium match, which depends on both G and
H. Note that we have S (z) = g(z)/h(S(z)). This implies an equilibrium utility of the
form
U(z, S(z),x(z)) = b(z, S(z),x(z)) − c(z,x(z)). (4)
Note that utility, through S(z), now depends on both the distribution G(z) of workers’
types and the distribution H(s) of ﬁrms’ characteristics. Furthermore, each worker’s
utility is increasing in her rank G(z) in the workforce.
Suppose positive assortative matching was assigned by a central planner, rather
than determined by the workers’ competitively chosen investments. In this case, what
level of investment would workers choose? Because workers can gain from their own
investment x, their choice will be greater than zero if indeed bx > 0. The level of
investment that is optimal in the absence of matching considerations will be useful as a
point of comparison with the Nash equilibrium level of investment that will eventually
be derived.
DEFINITION 1. Let x = N(z) maximize U(z, S(z), x); that is, let the complementary
slackness condition
N(z)[bx(z, S(z), N(z)) − cx(z, N(z))] = 0
hold at every level of z ∈ [z, ¯ z]. The function N(z) is the privately optimal level of
investment x under NTU.
Suppose now one agent produces x(ˆ z) in place of her equilibrium choice x(z) and
then chooses ˆ z to maximize her payoff. Her reduced form utility is U(z, S(ˆ z),x(ˆ z)),
which yields the following ﬁrst-order condition:
(bx(z, S(ˆ z),x(ˆ z)) − cx(z,x(ˆ z)))x (ˆ z) + bs(z, S(ˆ z),x(ˆ z))S (ˆ z) = 0. (5)
In a symmetric equilibrium we must have ˆ z = z. Using this and rearranging the
resulting ﬁrst-order condition, we obtain the differential equation
x (z) =
bs(z, S(z),x)
cx(z,x) − bx(z, S(z),x)
S (z). (6)
This differential equation will give us our equilibrium strategy, when combined with




z). This boundary condition implies that the lowest
ranked worker acts as though matching considerations did not matter. This reﬂects the
equilibrium competitive response to the expectation that one is going to come last.Hopkins Job Market Signaling of Relative Position 299
PROPOSITION 1. There exists a unique solution to the differential equation (6), with
the boundary condition x(z) = N(z). This solution, together with the assortative
matching scheme (2), constitutes the unique symmetric separating equilibrium to the
tournament matching game under NTU. In equilibrium, investment is greater and
workers’ equilibrium utility is lower than with privately optimum investment; that is,
x(z) > N(z) and U(z, S(z), x(z)) < U(z, S(z), N(z)) everywhere on (z, ¯ z].
The proof follows (see the Appendix) from the results of Mailath (1987) on
the existence of separating equilibria in standard signaling models. Because it is a
separating equilibrium, beliefs held by ﬁrms about worker quality will be accurate.
Speciﬁcally,aﬁrmobservingaworkerwhoinvestsxi correctlybelievesthatherquality
is zi = x−1(xi). On the other hand, it is possible, as in standard signaling models, to
constructotherequilibriabasedondifferentbeliefs.Forexample,apoolingequilibrium
where all workers choose the same investment level ˆ x can be supported if all ﬁrms
believe that levels of investment other than ˆ x indicate a low-quality worker. Since
all ﬁrms consequently view all workers as being equally able (and all have the same
investment), any matching, including random matching, would be stable.
Animportantquestionwillbewhetherseparatingequilibriaareefﬁcient.Compare
x(z) with N(z), the amount invested if the assortative matching scheme S(z)w a s
imposed. Proposition 1 establishes that, from the point of view of workers, they are
Pareto ranked. Workers obtain the same match in both cases, but with higher effort
in the separating equilibrium. All workers (except the lowest type z) would be better
off under N(z). To be clear, this does not imply that N(z) is socially optimal. When
investmentisproductiveandentersintotheproﬁtsofﬁrms(StoryB),welfareisamore
complex issue. We discuss this further in Section 5.
3. Transferable Utility
Supposeincontrasttowhatwehaveassumedsofarthatthesurpluscreatedbymatching
is fully divisible between the two partners. In the labor market we consider, this means
that workers and ﬁrms must bargain over wages. However, even with ﬂexible wages,
the job that a worker obtains and her equilibrium utility will still depend on her rank
in the distribution of workers. Furthermore, the wage she is paid in equilibrium will
depend on both the distribution of worker ability G(z) and the distribution of ﬁrm
quality H(s).
Becker (1973) discovered that in this case of transferable utility (TU), assortative
matching is only stable if the two attributes, here z and s, are complements in a joint
production process. This is in contrast to the case of nontransferable utility assumed
up to now, where stability requires only that workers’ utility be increasing in s and
ﬁrms’ proﬁts be increasing in z. In this section, we therefore need some additional
assumptions on the production function π(z, s, x): (c) πzs(z, s, x) > 0 and πzx(z, s, x)
≥ 0 (complementarity); (d) πsx(z, s, x) = 0 (partial separability); (e) πxx(z, s, x) ≤ 0
(concavity in investment). The complementarity condition (c) will be needed to ensure
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that will allow integrability of the wage function. Condition (e) will help to deﬁne the
privately optimal investment.
Denote the share of this product that goes to the worker as a wage w, and share of
the ﬁrm, a proﬁt r = π(z, s, x) − w. We now replace the original form of the worker’s
utility with
U(z,w,x) = w − c(z,x), (7)
which is exactly the form assumed by Spence (1974). That is, now the worker only
values a match in terms of the wages she will receive from that job. The assumptions
on the cost function c(z, x) remain the same.
What I again assume is that workers make their choice of investment non-
cooperatively. Then, matching between ﬁrms and workers takes place cooperatively in
that the outcome is assumed to be stable. In equilibrium, no worker has an incentive
to deviate given others’ choices and the matching scheme. With transferable utility,
positive assortative matching will not be stable unless the product of the match π(z,
s, x) can be divided in such a way that no worker–ﬁrm pair of differing ranks has the
incentive to match with each other rather than with a partner of the same rank. To
determine this, ﬁrst, we examine what the conditions for stable assortative matching
would be under complete information. Second, we ﬁnd that, because of the partial
separability assumption (d), the stability condition implies a wage schedule w(z, s, x)
whichdoesnotdependonthefunctionalformoftheworkers’strategyx(z).Thismeans
that the wage schedule is also applicable in the separating equilibrium of the game
of incomplete information.10 This is possible because in a separating equilibrium,
workers’ actions fully reveal their underlying type.
The ﬁrst step in determining the appropriate level of wages under complete
information is taken from Becker’s (1973) observation that stability requires that
the payment to each partner should be related to her marginal productivity. Given that
here a worker’s output depends both on her type z and her investment x, assumption
(d) will be important. It implies that a worker’s choice of investment x does not
affect her match. This is because, while condition (c) ensures complementarity in
types, condition (d) means that there is no complementarity between ﬁrm quality and
worker investment. Together they ensure that, under complete information, ﬁrms only
care about a worker’s ability z in choosing whom to hire. Thus, we consider positive
assortative matching only in terms of workers’ ability. Speciﬁcally, again we look at
the case where a worker of ability z will be matched with a ﬁrm of type S(z). For this
matching to be stable, for a given level of investment x, we must have
w(z + ε, S(z + ε),x) + π(z, S(z),x) − w(z, S(z),x) ≥ π(z + ε, S(z),x). (8)
That is, the total payoff to a worker of type z + ε and a ﬁrm of type S(z) must be greater
under the current matching arrangements than the output from a matching between
10. That is, the functional form of the wage schedule is the same under complete and incomplete
information. However, it will be shown that workers’ choices of investment will be higher with incomplete
information. Feeding this higher investment into the same wage schedule implies that wages at a given
ability level will be higher than under complete information. See Example 1 at the end of this section.Hopkins Job Market Signaling of Relative Position 301
each other. Otherwise, the worker of type z + ε could strike a bargain with the ﬁrm of
type S(z) whereby both would be better off.
Turning to investment, if we ﬁx the type of worker at z, for stability given two
workers producing investment levels x + ε and x, it must be that
w(z, S(z),x + ε) + π(z, S(z),x) − w(z, S(z),x) ≥ π(z, S(z),x + ε). (9)
It is possible to derive equilibrium marginal conditions on the wage function by taking
the limit ε to zero. Speciﬁcally, in the proof of Proposition 2, it is shown that from (8)
and (9) one can derive
wz(z, S(z),x) + ws(z, S(z),x)S (z) = πz(z, S(z),x),
wx(z, S(z),x) = πx(z, S(z),x). (10)
Finally, we need a boundary condition for wage bargaining. Suppose that the
lowest wage is exogenously ﬁxed at C ≥ 0. It is then possible to integrate the marginal
conditions (10) to derive the wage function w(z, S(z), x) given in what follows. This
in turn will support positive assortative matching as a stable outcome for the matching
tournament.
PROPOSITION 2. Let C be an arbitrary constant satisfying 0 ≤ C ≤ π(z,s,0).






πz(t, S(t),0) dt +
  x
0
πx(z, S(z),t) dt + C; (11)
and this is the only stable matching.
Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001) offer a much more detailed treatment of a
similar problem, but where only the investment x but not the type z matters for the
surplus π.11 In our setup, the bargaining solution is complicated by wages potentially
depending on both type z and action x. In this context, assumption (d) is helpful as
it implies that the marginal conditions (10) are integrable. To see this, differentiate
the right-hand side of the wage equation (11) with respect to z and observe that the
derivative matches the ﬁrst differential equation in (10) only if πsx = 0.
This means that it is possible to construct the wage function w(z, S(z), x) from
the matching function S(z) and the exogenous functions πz, πx, without knowing
the equilibrium investment function x(z). Alternatively, one could combine the two
differential equations (10) into a single one in terms of observable investment, or
w (x) = wx(γ(x), S(z),x)
+
wz(γ(x), S(γ(x)),x) + ws(γ(x), S(γ(x)),x)S (γ(x))
x (γ(x))
, (12)
11. In particular, they show that the bargaining solution, here w(·), can have a ﬁnite number of
discontinuities or jumps, although, completely continuous solutions are not excluded. For simplicity, I
concentrate on continuous solutions.302 Journal of the European Economic Association
whereγ(x)=x−1(x),theinverseoftheworkers’ strategy.Butclearlysuchanapproach
depends on the strategy x(z). This in turn would require simultaneous solution of the
wage schedule and investment strategy, that is solution of the simultaneous differential
equations (12) and (14). Assumption (d) thus allows the current simpler method at a
relatively small cost in loss of generality.12
I now turn to incomplete information. Matches will be made and wage bargains
struck on the basis of the perceived type of the workers. However, in any separating
outcome, the wage equation (11) is still the condition for stability. Firms can observe
investment, from investment they can accurately deduce ability. More precisely, if
all workers adopt the strictly increasing strategy x(z), then, in equilibrium, ﬁrms
must believe that a worker choosing investment x(ˆ z) is of type ˆ z. Note that positive
assortativematchingisstableunderthewageschedule(11)foranypositiverelationship
between investment x and z, regardless of its exact functional form. Thus, whatever the
separating strategy x(z), if ﬁrms offer a wage w(ˆ z, S(ˆ z),x(ˆ z)) to a worker with visible
investment x(ˆ z), then positive assortive matching will be stable. Further, this is the
only stable matching.
We now turn to the prior stage where workers choose investment non-
cooperatively. I assume that a separating strategy x(z) is adopted by all workers and
that consequently wages are determined by the wage equation (11) and see if workers
have an incentive to deviate. If one worker contemplates a deviation to x(ˆ z), that is,
investing as if he were of type ˆ z, then he would be perceived to be of type ˆ z and expect
a match with a ﬁrm of type S(ˆ z) and a payment of w(ˆ z, S(ˆ z),x(ˆ z)), even though the
actual product of the match will be π(z, S(ˆ z),x(ˆ z)). This gives a reduced-form utility
of U = w(ˆ z, S(ˆ z),x(ˆ z)) − c(z,x(ˆ z)). To ﬁnd the condition for such a deviation not to
be proﬁtable, differentiate this with respect to ˆ z and set the resulting derivative to zero.
For a symmetric equilibrium, set ˆ z = z in the ﬁrst-order condition to obtain
wz(z, S(z),x(z)) + ws(z, S(z),x(z))S (z)
+ (wx(z, S(z),x(z)) − cx(z,x(z)))x (z) = 0. (13)
Then substituting from (10), one obtains the following differential equation:
x (z) =
πz(z, S(z),x)
cx(z,x) − πx(z, S(z),x)
. (14)
In order to provide a boundary condition for this equation, we must deﬁne a
level of investment x which is privately optimal, that is, one that is independent of
matching considerations. Assume that the positive assortative matching scheme S(z)
is exogenously imposed. This implies that an increase in x can only increase wages
by increasing output, not by achieving a more favorable match. Or in other words, in
the absence of matching considerations we need only consider the partial derivative
of wages with respect to investment wx(z, S(z), x) = πx. This enables the following
deﬁnition.
12. I do not believe that assumption (d) affects the qualitative results obtained. While this assumption is
essential for Proposition 2, it could be replaced by a (weaker) complementarity assumption πsx ≥ 0i nt h e
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DEFINITION 2. Let x = T(z) maximize U = w(z, S(z), x) − c(z, x); that is, the
complementary slackness condition
T(z)[wx(z, S(z),T(z)) − cx(z,T(z))]
= T(z)[πx(z, S(z),T(z)) − cx(z,T(z))] = 0 (15)
holds at every level of z ∈ [z, ¯ z]. The function T(z) is called the privately optimal level
of investment x under TU.
Equation (15) has a unique solution by assumption (e) on π(·) and the assumption
thatc(·)isconvexinx.Notethatwheninvestmentisproductive(StoryB,πx >0),then
it can be that T(z) > 0. That is, the equilibrium investment by the least able worker
may be greater than zero (but when πx = 0, then T(z) = 0). This is because, with
productive investment and transferable utility, additional investment is worthwhile
even to the least able as it increases wages. In any case, this privately optimal level
of investment will give us the appropriate boundary condition, x(z) = T(z) for the
equilibrium differential equation. That is, again the lowest-ranked worker chooses the
privately optimal investment. This, together with the earlier Proposition 1, leads to the
next result.
PROPOSITION 3. There exists a unique solution to the differential equation (14).
Together with the boundary condition x(z) = T(z) and with the assortative matching
scheme(2)andthewagefunction(11),thissolutionconstitutesasymmetricequilibrium
of the tournament matching game with transferable utility. In equilibrium, investment
is greater and workers’ equilibrium utility is lower than with privately optimum
investment; that is, x(z) > T(z) and
w(z, S(z),x(z)) − c(z,x(z)) <w (z, S(z),T(z)) − c(z,T(z))
everywhere on (z, ¯ z].
Our equilibrium differential equation (14), while clearly not identical to the
differential equation (6) that arose in the NTU case, does depend on the distributions
G(z) and H(s) through the function S(z). Hence, both equilibrium payments w(z,
S(z), x) and the equilibrium strategy x(z) will respond to changes in either in the
distribution of ability G(z) or of jobs H(z). As well as the above-mentioned separating
equilibrium, there will also exist pooling equilibria in which wages would reﬂect
average productivity. In that sense, it is true that pooling equilibria, of the current
and classic model, do respond to changes in demand and supply that affect average
productivity. In particular, an increase in the quality of workers would lead to an
increase in wages while investment would remain ﬁxed across all workers. In contrast,
in the separating equilibrium we examine, we will see that investment would change,
and wages would fall at each level of ability.
In any case, just as for NTU, in the separating equilibrium investment is excessive
from the point of view of workers. All workers (except with the lowest ability z) will
invest more than what is privately optimal. Wages can be higher but the increase in
costs is greater so that workers are deﬁnitely worse off than with assortative matching304 Journal of the European Economic Association
and the privately optimal level of investment. Here is a speciﬁc example of such an
equilibrium.
Example. Assume that the production function is π(z, s, x) = zs + x and that the cost
function is c(z, x) = x2 − xz + x. Assume further G(·) = H(·) with z = s = 0 so that
S(z) = z. Thus, πz(z, S(z), x) = S(z) and πx(z, S(z), x) = 1. If w( 0 ,0 ,0 )= 0, then by
the previous analysis, w(z, S(z), x) = z2/2 + x. In this case, solving (15), the privately
optimal investment is T(z) = z/2. In contrast, for the noncooperative equilibrium the
differentialequation(14)isnowx (z)=z/(2x−z)withx(0)=0,whichhasthesolution
x(z) = z. Given the privately optimal investment, wages would be w(z, S(z), T(z)) =
z2/2 + z/2 and will be lower at a given level of ability z than in the non-cooperative
equilibrium, w(z, S(z), x(z)) = z2/2 + z, as there workers invest more. However, given
the additional costs incurred, workers would be better-off if all made the privately
optimal investment:
w(z, S(z),T(z)) − c(z,T(z)) = 3z2/4 > z2/2 = w(z, S(z),x(z)) − c(z,x(z)).
4. Comparative Statics
We will now consider the effect on equilibrium utility and strategies of changes in
the distribution of workers’ abilities G(z) and of ﬁrms or jobs H(s). In doing this,
we consider only separating equilibria. We saw in Sections 2 and 3 that equilibrium
behavior depends on the matching function S which is jointly determined by G and H.
Our ﬁrst question is what are the effects of changes in the underlying distributions on
the matching function S(z). We will then be better placed to answer questions about
changes in equilibrium behavior.
In what follows we assume two economies A, B that are identical apart from
having different distributions of workers or different distributions of jobs. Importantly,
we interpret an increase in quality of workers or a decrease in the quality of jobs, in
the form respectively of a stochastically higher or stochastically lower distribution, as
increasesinthecompetitivenessofthelabormarket.Sinceinthematchingtournaments
considered here workers compete in quality, an increase in the quality of other workers
will worsen the competitive situation of a given worker. Equally, as workers compete
to obtain high-quality jobs, if high-quality jobs become relatively scarce, competition
will become more intense. Changes in the relative quantity of jobs and workers are
considered in Section 6 and give similar results. For investigation of the effect of
changes in the degree of inequality amongst workers in a similar framework, see
Hopkins and Kornienko (2004). For analysis of the effect of changes in the distribution
of prizes in tournaments, see Moldovanu and Sela (2006), an analysis that is expanded
to matching tournaments with a ﬁnite number of participants in Hoppe, Moldovanu,
andSela(2009).HopkinsandKornienko(2009,2010)proposeadifferentmethodology
for comparative statics, which makes comparisons at a constant rank (here r = G(z))
rather than at a constant ability z.
Whenwechangeonedistributionweholdtheotherconstant.Forexample,suppose
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FIGURE 1. A worker with ability ˆ z has a match SA under the stochastically higher distribution of
ability GA that is worse than the match SB under the lower distribution of ability GB.
jobs H(s) is ﬁxed and is the same in both economy A and economy B. Further, I
assume that the support of the distribution of workers remains [z, ¯ z] and the support
of the distribution of jobs is [s, ¯ s]. Stochastic dominance is often used to order
different distributions. One says that one distribution GA stochastically dominates,
or is stochastically higher than, another distribution GB if GA(z) ≤ GB(z) for all z.
Here, I employ a modest reﬁnement of stochastic dominance and write GA > st GB if
GA(z) < GB(z) for all z ∈ (z, ¯ z) and G 
A(z) < G 
B(z).13
LEMMA 2. If either GA > stGB or if HB > stHA, then SA(z) < SB(z) for all z ∈ (z, ¯ z)
and S 
A(z) < S 
B(z).
That is, if the distribution of workers becomes stochastically higher, or if the
distributionofjobqualitybecomesstochasticallyworse,thenthejobassignedbecomes
worse at almost every ability. Note that the comparative statics from changes in H are
the reverse to those from changes in G. These results are illustrated in Figures 1 and
2. Notice that if we constrain the distributions so that G(·) = H(·), then S(z) = z, and
any dependence of matching on the distributions disappear. As changes in the two
distributions have opposite effects, if the two distributions are constrained to be equal
to each other, a movement of one distribution is cancelled out by the movement of the
other.
4.1. Nontransferable Utility
We have just seen how matching responds to changes in the distribution of jobs H(s)
or workers G(z): in a more competitive environment, for a given level of ability z a
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FIGURE 2. A worker with ability ˆ z has a match SA under the stochastically lower distribution of jobs
HA that is worse than the match SB under the higher distribution of jobs HB.
worker is matched with a worse job. We now see how equilibrium investment and
utility reacts to such changes. The effects are not obvious as we will see that the effect
on investment is not monotonic. Low-ability workers will invest an amount that is
closer to their privately optimal amount in a more competitive economy, and yet they
are still worse-off.
This nonmonotonicity of investment is easy to explain. Imagine a foot race where
a new, very fast runner is added to the ﬁeld. Those runners who are not very fast realize
that the prospects of placing high up the ﬁeld are even lower and therefore try less
hard. Those runners who are competing for the top places realize that competition is
now ﬁercer and respond accordingly.
Let U(z) = b(z, S(z), x(z)) − c(z, x(z)) be a worker’s equilibrium utility under
NTU. We have by the envelope theorem, U (z) = bz(z, S(z), x(z)) − cz(z, x(z)). I show
that, despite the ambiguous effect on investment, equilibrium utility will be lower in
a more competitive environment, that is, when G(z) is stochastically higher or H(s)i s
stochastically lower.
In effect, the fall in S(z) at each level of z has a ﬁrst-order effect on workers’
utility through the beneﬁt function b(z, S(z), x(z)). The fact that costs may also fall
for low-ability workers as their investment falls is not enough to compensate. The
assumption (iv) on complementarity in beneﬁts and costs is crucial for this. These
results are illustrated in Figure 3.
PROPOSITION 4. Suppose that either GA(z) > st GB(z),o rH B(z) > st HA(z).L e tU A(z)
and UB(z) and xA(z) and xB(z) be the corresponding NTU equilibrium utility and
equilibrium investment strategies respectively. Then, ﬁrst, UA(z) < UB(z) for all z in
(z, ¯ z]. Second, there is a point ˜ z ∈ (z, ¯ z) such that xB(z) > xA(z) on the interval (z, ˜ z)
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FIGURE 3. Comparative statics under NTU. A stochastically higher distribution of ability or a
stochastically lower distribution of job quality leads to a lower matching function SA(z) and hence
lower utility UA(z) and lower (higher) investment by workers of low (high) ability.
4.2. Transferable Utility
It is also possible to obtain comparative statics for the model under TU, including what
happens to wages when the distributions change. In particular, in a more competitive
economy there is lower investment by all types of worker. Investment falls because in
a more competitive situation, a worker of given ability obtains a worse job. Because
ﬁrm quality is a complementary factor to workers’ marginal product πz(z, S(z), x),
the marginal product falls leading to lower incentives and less effort. These results
on investment in turn imply a similar result on workers’ utility. Let U(z) = w(z, S(z),
x(z)) − c(z, x(z)) be workers’ equilibrium utility under TU. As in NTU, the effect of
a lower match value S(z) dominates the effect of lower costs due to lower investment.
Thus, equilibrium utility will be lower at every level of ability in a more competitive
economy. These results are illustrated in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4. Comparative statics under TU. A stochastically higher distribution of ability or a
stochastically lower distribution of job quality leads to a lower matching function SA(z) and hence,
lower utility UA(z) and lower investment xA(z)b yw o r k e r s .308 Journal of the European Economic Association
PROPOSITION 5. Suppose that either GA(z) > st GB(z) or HB(z) > st HA(z).L e t
UA(z) and UB(z) and xA(z) and xB(z) be the corresponding TU equilibrium utility and
equilibrium investment strategies respectively. Then, xB(z) > xA(z) on (z, ¯ z]. Second,
UA(z) < UB(z) for all z in (z, ¯ z].
Deﬁne w(z) = w(z, S(z), x(z)) as the equilibrium wage schedule. One can then
show that, when the distribution of ability is stochastically higher, the equilibrium
wage is lower at each level of ability. In Spence’s (1973, 1974) original work, the
wage schedule was written in terms of visible investment or education x. Here, we
have w (x) = w (γ(x))/x (γ(x)) where z = γ(x) = x−1(x), the inverse of the equilibrium
strategy x(z). The wage schedule will be a solution to this differential equation with
boundary condition w(x(z)) = C. This can be used to show that wages will also be
lower at each level of investment.
PROPOSITION 6. Suppose that either GA(z) > st GB(z) or HB(z) > st HA(z).L e tw A(z)
and wB(z) be the corresponding equilibrium wage schedules. Then, wB(z) > wA(z) on
(z, ¯ z] and wB(x) > wA(x) on (x(z),xA(¯ z)].
4.3. Comparing NTU and TU
We have seen that there are different comparative statics when wages are ﬂexible
(TU) than when they are not (NTU). In particular, a more competitive environment,
such asastochastically higher distribution ofworker ability, produces uniformly lower
investmentunderTUbuthigherinvestmentbythehigh-abilityunderNTU.Letuslook
at what is driving this difference.
Suppose we take very simple formulations. For the NTU case, let b(z, s, x) = s,
the beneﬁt of holding a job is simply equal to the quality of the employer. Then, we
can write the equilibrium differential equation (6) as
cx(z,x(z)) = S (z)/x (z). (16)
Similarly, for expository purposes, suppose simply that π(z, s, x) = zs, then the
differential equation for the TU case (14) can be written
cx(z,x(z)) = S(z)/x (z). (17)
Inbothcases,wehavethemarginalcostofincreasinginvestmentxontheleft-hand
side, and the marginal beneﬁt on the right.
IntheTUcase,themarginalbeneﬁtisproportionaltoS(z)(ormoregenerallyπz(z,
S(z), x)), and will be lower everywhere in a more competitive environment (see, for
example, Figure 1). Under TU, incentives are driven by the wage which is determined
byaworker’smarginalproduct.Inamorecompetitiveenvironment,aworkerofagiven
ability gains a lower value match. Since the employer type is a strict complement, the
worker’s marginal product falls, lowering the incentive to invest at all levels of ability.
However, in an NTU world, the marginal return depends on S (z), the marginal
return to moving up in terms of one’s match. Again using the metaphor of a foot race,Hopkins Job Market Signaling of Relative Position 309
replacing low-quality runners with high-quality runners increases the relative density
of competitors at high ability levels and reduces it at low levels. The incentive to invest
is increased for the high-ability and reduced for the low-ability.
5. Efﬁciency
This section addresses the efﬁciency of equilibrium investment decisions. Given the
presence of incomplete information, it is no surprise that full social efﬁciency is not
obtained.However,whatisinterestingistheapplicationofthenovelcomparativestatics
techniques introduced in the previous section, to see whether efﬁciency increases or
decreases as the distributions of workers and jobs change.
If there are complementarities between ﬁrms and workers then, from the results
of Becker (1973), the maximization of total output demands the positive assortative
matching scheme S(z). Since matching is efﬁcient, this allows us to concentrate on a
different issue: whether, for each pair formed under this scheme, the worker chooses a
level of investment that is optimal from the point of view of joint welfare. Whether this
will be the case is not obvious as there are two factors that work in opposite directions.
First,workersareunlikelytointernalizethebeneﬁtoftheeffectofadditionalinvestment
ontheproﬁtsofﬁrms,leadingtotoolittleinvestment.Thatis,thereisaformofhold-up
problem. Second, competition between workers for matching opportunities can push
investment up, possibly to excessive levels. In the case of complete information, CMP
(2001) ﬁnd that as investment raises one’s marginal product, which in a TU framework
leads to higher wages, this solves the ﬁrst problem. Thus, efﬁcient investment is
possibleevenwithoutenforceablecontracts(seealsoPetersandSiow2002).However,
Peters (2007) ﬁnds that, in a NTU framework, again under complete information, the
second factor is stronger than the ﬁrst, and investment is inefﬁciently high.
Turningtothetournamentsunderincompleteinformationconsideredhere,wehave
already seen that investment is excessive from the point of view of workers. This leads
immediately to the result that when such investment is not useful for ﬁrms (Story A),
its equilibrium level is also socially excessive. But it is possible to show that, under
TU, investment is still too high even when investment is productive. In contrast, under
NTU, I ﬁnd productive investment under some circumstances will be too low.
This difference arises because what is privately optimal is also socially optimal
under TU, but is too low under NTU. The lowest ranked individual in both cases will
choose what is privately optimal. Thus, under NTU we start too low, and under TU we
start just right. As non-cooperative investment for higher levels of ability rises above
the privately optimal level, under TU investment will be too high everywhere, while
under NTU we may eventually rise above the social optimum at high levels of ability.
As the tournament becomes more competitive, the two cases diverge. As we have
seen in the previous section, greater competition lowers the quality of job obtained for
a given level of ability. This lowers a worker’s marginal product, leading to reduced
investment under TU. Thus, investment will become closer to the optimum. Under
NTU, greater competition discourages the low-ability and their investment falls, even310 Journal of the European Economic Association
though it is too low already. However, high-ability workers will invest more under
greater competition even though their investment may already be excessive. Thus,
under NTU, greater competition can lead to greater inefﬁciency. Notice, however, we
have already seen that under both TU and NTU, this increase in competition makes
workers worse off (Propositions 4 and 5). So, any gains in efﬁciency in the TU case
do not go to workers.
There is another potential point of comparison. Rege (2008) and Hoppe,
Moldavanu, and Sela (2009), in matching tournament models similar to the current
one,compareaseparatingoutcomethatsupportspositiveassortativematchingnotwith
the social optimum but with a pooling outcome and consequent random matching. The
welfare comparisons are in general ambiguous as when there are complements in
production, there is a trade-off between the costs of signaling and the beneﬁts of
assortative matching that it permits. However, Hoppe et al. ﬁnd that for plausible-type
distributions total welfare is higher in the pooling equilibrium with zero signals than
in the separating equilibrium. An important difference is that in their analysis, signals
are entirely wasteful (Story A). Here, the most interesting results are where signals
take the form of productive investment. Clearly, a pooling equilibrium with zero or
minimal investment will be less attractive in such an environment than in the model
of Hoppe et al. But achieving clear welfare comparisons would not be possible in this
more complex environment without making very strong assumptions on preferences
and costs.
5.1. Nontransferable Utility
Under NTU, as we have already seen (Proposition 1), the lowest ability worker has no
incentive to invest more than is privately optimal. As we will now see, as under
Story B, such investment would beneﬁt her employer, this level of investment
is inadequate from a social point of view. In contrast, for higher-ability workers
competition for matches raises investment above privately optimal levels, and possibly
above socially optimal levels too.
Let us assume that the total welfare of an individual match between a ﬁrm and
worker is given by a weighted sum of the worker’s utility and the ﬁrm’s proﬁt:
W = U(z, S(z),x) + βπ(z, S(z),x), (18)
for some β>0. For example, if the beneﬁts to a worker are a ﬁxed proportion of the
product b(z, s, x) = απ(z, s, x) with α ∈ (0, 1), then β = 1 − α. Then the ﬁrst-order
conditions for an interior solution to a social planner’s choice of investment are
dW
dx
= bx(z, S(z),x) − cx(z,x) + βπx(z, S(z),x) = 0. (19)
Note that if πx is zero, so that x is nonproductive, the social optimum requires x to
be equal to the privately optimal level N(z) (which may be zero). Then, immediately
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unproductive, in equilibrium its supply is excessive. However, if we make the
assumption that investment is productive or πx > 0, then comparison of (5) and
(19) leads directly to the next result.
PROPOSITION 7. Assume conditions (c)–(e) on π(·) and that πx(z, s, x) > 0. Then
there exists a unique solution x = N∗(z) > 0 to equation (19) at each level of z. For
at least some types, the non-cooperative level of investment x(z) is less than the social
optimum N∗(z). That is, there is an z1 ∈ (z, ¯ z] such that x(z) < N∗(z) on [z,z1).T o
comparetwoeconomiesA,Bassumeeither GA(z)> st GB(z)or HB(z)> st HA(z).Then,
there is an z2 ∈ (z, ¯ z) such that xA(z) < xB(z) < N∗(z) on (z,z2).
That is, at least some low types invest too little as their low prospects give no
incentive to do more than that which is privately optimal. However, it is impossible
to determine for higher types whether investment is too high or too low. While it is
possible for all types to invest too little, one would imagine that typically high types
will invest too much. Particularly, if the production function is strictly concave, then as
the marginal product of investment falls, the socially optimal investment will approach
the privately optimal level for high x and cross the non-cooperative level.
The results on investment do have a striking conclusion, as illustrated in Figure 5
. In the more competitive environment, which has a matching function SA(z) that is
worse from the point of view of workers, distortions from the socially optimal are
larger. In particular, the low-type workers who in any case invest too little will invest
even less. And the high-ability workers who may put in too much effort will do even
more. Note that Figure 5 illustrates only one particular scenario: in general, there is no
assurance that N∗ will cross xA and xB only once or that it will cross at all.
FIGURE 5. Under NTU, investment in the more competitive environment xA may be further from
the social optimum N∗ for low- and high-ability workers than investment in the less-competitive
environment xB.312 Journal of the European Economic Association
5.2. Transferable Utility
Under TU, the welfare results are quite different. The fact that wages respond
to productive investment gives a natural incentive to invest. Unfortunately, under
incomplete information, investment also serves to gain an improved match, which
leads to excess investment. The total payoff of a match is given by
W = π(z, S(z),x) − c(z,x) (20)






= x[πx(z,s,x) − cx(z,x)] = 0. (21)
That is, when x is a productive investment, the social optimum equates the marginal
costofinvestmenttotheworkercx andtheinvestment’smarginalproductπx.Notethat
under TU, this condition is the same as for the privately optimal level of investment
T(z). This reﬂects the results of CMP (2001), who ﬁnd that with complete information,
a matching tournament can induce the efﬁcient amount of investment.
However, under incomplete information there is a gap between private incentives
andthesocialoptimum.Thisisbecauseeachindividualhasanadditionalprivatereturn
from increasing investment as it permits a better match. However, a change in either
the distribution of jobs or workers that induces greater competition pushes investment
closer to the socially optimal level.
PROPOSITION 8. In the matching tournament with incomplete information and under
TU, the equilibrium level of investment x(z) exceeds the socially optimal level T∗(z)
almost everywhere. To compare two economies A, B assume either GA(z) > st GB(z) or
HB(z) > st HA(z). Then, xB(z) > xA(z) > T∗(z) on(z, ¯ z].
6. Unemployment
Until now, we have assumed that all workers are matched to jobs. Obviously, it is a
characteristic of many real-world labor markets that the least successful candidates
fail to attract any offers as there are more candidates than there are job openings. It is
relatively easy to modify the basic matching tournament model to allow for this. We
ﬁndagainthatthemodeldeliverssensiblecomparativestatics.Forexample,adecrease
in the number of jobs available relative to the number of workers will, in the TU case,
lower wages at every level of ability.
Assume now that that the measure of ﬁrms relative to that of workers is 1 − μ,s o
that a proportion 1 >μ>0 of workers will not ﬁnd employment. Under assortative
matching, these will be the least able, so that those having ability on the range [z, ˆ z),
where G(ˆ z) = μ, will be unemployed and have no match, which I write as s = s0
with s0 < s, that is, the value of being unmatched is worse than being matched to theHopkins Job Market Signaling of Relative Position 313
worst job. The beneﬁts from being unemployed are assumed to be different in TU and












for z ∈ [ˆ z, ¯ z].
(22)
This implies that S (z) is equal to zero on [z, ˆ z) and to g(z)/(h(S(z))(1 − μ)) on [ˆ z, ¯ z].
Our main interest is the effect of increased scarcity of jobs on equilibrium
outcomes. An increase in μ in this framework is like a proportional increase in
the population of workers at every level of ability, while keeping the distribution
of available jobs ﬁxed. Thus, an increase in unemployment increases competition for
jobs. Given the matching rule (22), an increase in μ, the proportion unemployed, will
lower the quality of job for those who ﬁnd employment for a given ability level (that
is, S(z) falls on the range [ˆ z, ¯ z]). Given that this effect is similar to the one generated
by a decrease in quality in jobs as analyzed in Section 4, perhaps not surprisingly the
consequent comparative static effects are also similar.
6.1. Nontransferable Utility
Againitispossibletoconstructasymmetricseparatingequilibriumbasedonassortative
matching. Given our earlier assumption that a worker’s beneﬁt is increasing in the
quality of her match, it must be that b(z,s0,x) < b(z,s,x). That is, the beneﬁt of
unemployment is worse than that of the worst job. Further, since the match they obtain
does not vary with investment, those workers who anticipate unemployment will not
invest any more than the privately optimal level. A problem is that if the worst job is
strictly better than unemployment, there must be a jump in the equilibrium strategy
x(z)a tˆ z to prevent unemployed workers imitating the investment levels of those who
are successful. It is still possible for there to be a pure strategy equilibrium, provided
one provides suitable off-equilibrium beliefs.
PROPOSITION 9. Let x(z) = N(z) on [z, ˆ z) where μ = G(ˆ z).L e t ˆ x ≥ N(ˆ z) solve
U(ˆ z,s, ˆ x) = U(ˆ z,s0, N(ˆ z)).L e tx (z) be the solution to (6) on [ˆ z, ¯ z] with boundary
condition x(ˆ z) = ˆ x. Then x(z), together with the matching scheme (22), is a symmetric
equilibrium strategy of the matching tournament under NTU.
The obvious question is, what happens if the ratio of workers to jobs increases?
Clearly, unemployment goes up, but we can also show that worker utility falls as the
job market becomes more competitive. Further, it discourages effort for the lowly
ranked, but increases investment by the highly ranked. Deﬁne G(ˆ zi) = μi for i = A,
B. With higher μ, the ability level of the lowest-ranked worker to ﬁnd employment
will be also be higher, so that ˆ zA > ˆ zB if μA >μ B. In fact, it is relatively easy to
obtain appropriate results from the earlier Proposition 4, replacing z with ˆ zB at each314 Journal of the European Economic Association
point of the proof. So, the comparative statics with unemployment are stated here as a
corollary.
COROLLARY1. SupposeμA >μ B.Letx A(z),UA(z)andxB(z),UB(z)betheequilibrium
strategy and utility respectively under the two respective values of μ. Then, UA(z) <
UB(z) for all z ∈ (ˆ zB, ¯ z]. Further, there is a point ˜ z ∈ (ˆ zB, ¯ z) such that xA(z) < xB(z)
on (ˆ zB, ˜ z) but xA(z) > xB(z) on (˜ z, ¯ z].
6.2. Transferable Utility
Under TU, assume that the μ unmatched workers are paid a ﬁxed wage or beneﬁt so
that w(z,s0,x) = w for z ∈ [z, ˆ z). Clearly, again the unemployed choose the privately
optimal investment, as investment affects neither their wage nor match. As in the NTU
case, there may be a problem with a discontinuity at ˆ z as there S(z) jumps from s0 to
s. Particularly, if the worst job pays more than the unemployment beneﬁt, then some
unemployed workers might be happy to raise investment above the privately optimal
level in order to get that job.
Thus, for a pure strategy equilibrium we need continuity in the wage schedule.
This is possible, if the worst ﬁrm appropriates the entire surplus of the match with
the worst employed worker, so that the worst employed worker is paid no more than
the unemployed. This is technically convenient but the presence of an excess supply
of labor makes it reasonable economically. The way to implement this is to set the
value of the constant C in the wage equation (11) to be equal to a particular value, in





πz(t, S(t),0) dt +
  x
T(ˆ z)
πx(z, S(z),t) dt + w. (23)
So, the wage of the lowest ranked employed worker is equal to the unemployment
beneﬁt, or w(ˆ z,s,T(ˆ z)) = w. We then have the following equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 10. Let w(z, S(z),x) = w on [z, ˆ z) and let w(z, S(z), x)be given by
equation (23) on the interval [ˆ z, ¯ z], where S(z) is as given in equation (22). Let x(z) =
T(z) on [z, ˆ z), where μ = G(ˆ z) and, on [ˆ z, ¯ z], let x(z) be the solution to equation (14)
with boundary condition x(ˆ z) = T(ˆ z). Then x(z) is a symmetric equilibrium strategy
of the matching tournament under TU.
Itisalsopossibletoshowthatanincreaseinunemploymentwilllowerequilibrium
wages and utility. Investment falls at each ability level as well. Again the result follows
from the earlier comparative statics results of Propositions 5 and 6.
COROLLARY 2. Suppose μA >μ B and let G(ˆ zi) = μi for i = A, B. Let wA(z), xA(z),
UA(z)and wB(z),xB(z),UB(z)be,respectivelytheequilibriumwage,strategyandutility
under the two respective values of μ. Then wA(z) < wB(z), xA(z) < xB(z) and UA(z) <
UB(z) on (ˆ zB, ¯ z].Hopkins Job Market Signaling of Relative Position 315
7. Conclusions
This paper has introduced a model of relative signaling in a tournament-like labor
market. By allowing for vertical differentiation among employers as well as workers,
it generalizes the classic model of Spence (1973). Competition for good jobs generates
competition for relative position, implying that the outcome for any individual worker
depends on the distribution of characteristics of all ﬁrms and all workers. It is true that
these relative effects are known to exist in matching and assignment models—see, for
example, Costrell and Loury (2004). However, in the assignment literature, matching
is based on the intrinsic characteristics of workers and jobs. Therefore there is no
explicit competition between workers, no comparative statics on workers’ education
decisions, and no welfare analysis, as everything is efﬁcient. Here, matching is based
on investment decisions by workers that are driven by the matching opportunities
available. This feature differentiates the model from traditional signaling models, as
here changes in either the distribution of ﬁrms and workers, representing changes in
the demand and supply of labor respectively, affect equilibrium strategies and welfare.
The equilibria in this model, as is common under imperfect information, are not
efﬁcient. Workers may overinvest in education because it serves as a signal of ability
as well as increasing productivity. The innovation here is to show that, when the
job market is a tournament, this inefﬁciency depends on the distribution of ability.
As Frank (1997) observes, such positional competition has externalities which could
potentially be lessened by taxation. That is, suitable labor taxes could increase rather
than decrease labor market efﬁciency. One of the contributions of this paper is to
reﬁne previous arguments that have focused on the case where position is signaled by
wasteful activities, such as conspicuous consumption. In fact, it is when signaling is in
the form of a productive activity such as education that the current model of positional
competition gives the greatest support for redistributive taxation.14 This is because, in
the equilibrium of the matching tournament analyzed here, low-ability workers can
underinvest in developing useful skills, and high-ability workers may overinvest with
respect to the social optimum.
I also hope that matching tournaments will provide a useful framework for the
analysis of a number of labor market issues. It has been found (Oyer 2006) that the
returns to participating in a matching labor market can be procyclical, with graduates
obtainingbettermatchesingoodyearsthaninbad.However,thereisafurtherquestion
of whether such variations in the level of competition are anticipated by market
participants, leading to changes in their investment decisions in a way predicted by the
model presented here. Two recent empirical studies provide fascinating supporting
evidence. Ramey and Ramey (2009) report that US parents are investing more
time in their children’s education in response to increased competition in university
admissions. Similarly, Wei and Zhang (2009) argue that parents in China anticipate the
14. According to earlier work (Hopkins and Kornienko 2004), taxes that correct the externality from
wasteful expenditure are as likely to be regressive as progressive.316 Journal of the European Economic Association
competition that their sons will face in the marriage market due to unbalanced gender
ratios, and so increase saving to enhance their sons’ relative wealth.
This paper already has shown that greater competition can induce greater
dispersion in educational investment with those at the bottom end of the labor market
investing less and the high-ability investing more. It has also demonstrated that the
labor market response will depend on the degree of wage ﬂexibility. For example,
if wages are not fully ﬂexible then this increase in competition will actually worsen
efﬁciency.Thissuggeststhattheeffectsofgreatercompetitiononinvestmentdecisions
will be different in countries that have ﬂexible labor markets than in those where labor
markets are more regulated. In order to address these issues more fully, further work is
necessary to develop the analysis of the simultaneous determination of education and
wages, an issue that has only received an initial treatment here.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. In a symmetric equilibrium with a strictly increasing strategy x(z),
the probability that an agent of type zi has higher investment than another of type zj
will be
F(x(zi)) = Pr[x(zi) > x(z j)] = Pr[x−1(x(zi)) > z j] = G(zi).
Then the positive assortative matching φ that assigns an agent with investment xi to a
ﬁrm of type si = H−1(F(xi)) = H−1(G(zi)) is clearly stable as while any worker with
rank G(zi) would prefer a match with any ﬁrm with s > H−1(G(zi)), such a ﬁrm would
prefer its current match whose z, say ˆ z, would be greater than zi (and since x(z)i s
strictly increasing, ˆ x = x(ˆ z) > xi). Suppose there is another matching ˜ φ, such that a
set of workers Z with positive measure are matched differently than under the positive
assortative matching φ. Then, there must exist ˆ z ∈ Z, such that ˜ φ(G(ˆ z)) > G(ˆ z), that
is, there must be a positive measure of workers who are matched strictly higher than
under φ. For this matching to be stable, all workers with ability higher than ˆ z must
be matched with ﬁrms whose s is greater than ˜ φ(G(ˆ z)). If not, then ﬁrm s = ˜ φ(G(ˆ z))
could propose a match with a worker of type ˜ z where ˜ z > ˆ z and the worker ˜ z would
ﬁnd it acceptable. But the measure of workers with z higher than ˆ z, λ(z ≥ ˆ z), is strictly
larger than the measure of ﬁrms with s greater than ˜ φ(G(ˆ z)), λ(s ≥ ˜ φ(G(ˆ z))). But this
implies that ˜ φ is not measure-preserving. 
Proof of Proposition 1. That the only separating equilibrium is a solution to the
differential equation (6) with boundary condition x(z) = N(z) follows from Theorems
1 and 2 of Mailath (1987, p. 1353). It then follows by Proposition 3 of Mailath
(1987, p. 1362) that x(z) > N(z)o n( z, ¯ z). The task is to show that the current
model ﬁts into Mailath’s framework. First, the boundary condition must hold as in
a separating equilibrium, an individual with ability z has perceived rank 0 and utility
U(z,s,x) = U(z,s,x(z)) that does not depend on the agent’s rank. Therefore, in
equilibrium she chooses x to maximize U(z,s,x). That is, she must choose N(z), orHopkins Job Market Signaling of Relative Position 317
there would be a proﬁtable deviation. Second, in Mailath’s paper, the signaler’s utility
is of the form (in current notation) V(z, ˆ z,x) where V is a smooth utility function and
ˆ z istheperceivedtype,sothatinaseparatingequilibrium thesignalerhasutilityV(z,z,
x). To apply this here, ﬁrst, ﬁx G(z) and H(s). Now, clearly, one can deﬁne the function
V(·) such that V(z, ˆ z,x) = b(z, S(ˆ z),x) − c(z,x) everywhere on [z, ¯ z] × [s, ¯ s] × R+.
One can then verify that the conditions (i)–(v) imposed on U(·) imply conditions
(1)–(5) of Mailath (1987, p. 1352) on V.15 Condition (1) is that V is C2, condition (2)
is that V2 is always nonzero, and here V2 = bz > 0. Condition (3) is that V13 is never
zero and here V13 = bzx − czx > 0. Since here V33 < 0, Mailath’s condition (5) that
V3 is bounded when V33 ≥ 0 is automatically satisﬁed.
Mailath’s condition (4) requires that V3(z, z, x) = 0 has a unique solution in x
which maximizes V(z, z, x). If bx > 0, then this follows from the assumptions that bxx
≤ 0, and the assumption that c is convex in x.H o w e v e r ,i fbx = 0, then the maximizer
of V(z, z, x) with respect to x is x = N(z) = 0. This actually makes equivalent results to
Mailath’s easier. In particular, Mailath’s Proposition 3 that establishes that, in current
notation, x(z)  = N(z)o n(z, ¯ z] becomes easy as if bx = 0 then x (z) = bs(z, S(z), x)/cx(z,
x) > 0 = N (z). This also obviates the need for Mailath’s Proposition 5 as the simpler
differential equation x (z) = bs(z, S(z), x)/cx(z, x) is Lipschitz continuous even at z.
Finally,toshowthatworkersareworseoffthanunderprivatelyoptimalinvestment,
let U(z) = b(z, S(z), x(z)) − c(z, x(z)) and UN(z) = b(z, S(z), N(z)) − c(z, N(z)) denote
equilibrium utility and utility under privately optimal investment N(z) respectively.
Since N(z) maximizes a worker’s utility given match S(z) and x(z) > N(z) for all
z ∈ (z, ¯ z), the result follows. 
ProofofProposition2. FollowingBecker(1973)(seealsoSattinger1979;CMP2001),
one obtains from (8),
w(z + ε, S(z + ε),x) − w(z, S(z),x) ≥ π(z + ε, S(z),x) − π(z, S(z),x).
Dividing both sides by   and taking the limit of   to zero, one ﬁnds that
wz(z, S(z),x) + ws(z, S(z),x)S (z) ≥ πz(z, S(z),x). (A.1)
Similarly from (9), one obtains
wx(z, S(z),x) ≥ πx(z, S(z),x). (A.2)
This also give us a bound on the total derivative dw(z, S(z), x)/dz ≥ πz + πxx (z). A
similar analysis ﬁnds that the share of the ﬁrm satisﬁes
dr(z, S(z),x)/dz ≥ πs(z, S(z),x)S (z). (A.3)
15. Mailath, in proving the intermediate result Proposition 5 (1987, p. 1364), also assumes that ∂V/∂ˆ z
is bounded. Here, if we assume that both bs and S
 (z) are bounded (the latter requires g(·) is bounded and










= πxx (z) + πz + S (z)πs,
theprecedingconditionsholdwithequality.ThechoiceoftheboundaryconditionC =
w(z,s,0) is arbitrary, except that it must be feasible, that is 0 ≤ w(z,0) ≤ π(z,s,0).
We check that these marginal conditions imply general as well as local stability
(that is, it is not possible to construct a blocking pair even when one can choose any
type, and not just within a radius of ε). Take any two types of worker z1, z2 with z2 >
z1. The stability condition (8) can be rewritten as
w(z2, S(z2),x) − w(z1, S(z1),x) ≥ π(z2, S(z1),x) − π(z1, S(z1),x).
Using wz(z, S(z), x) + ws(z, S(z), x)S (z) = πz(z, S(z), x), yields
  z2
z1
πz(z, S(z),x) dz ≥
  z2
z1
πz(z, S(z1),x) dz. (A.4)
Now,sincematchingispositiveandassortative,thematchingfunctionS(z)isincreasing
and S(z) > S(z1) for any z ∈ (z1, z2]. If, as assumed, πzs > 0 then the inequality (A.4)
must hold for any pair z2 > z1.
To prove that positive assortative matching is the only stable form of matching,
suppose that instead there is a matching ˜ φ that is not positive assortative. Let
˜ S(z) = ˜ φ(G(z)). Then, one can choose z2 > z1 such that ˜ S(z1) > ˜ S(z) for all z
on the interval (z1, z2). For this matching to be stable, given z2 > z1, wages must
satisfy the inequality (8) and hence the inequality (A4) with ˜ S(·) replacing S(·). But
as ˜ S(z) < ˜ S(z1)o n( z1, z2) and given the complementarity assumptions (c) on π(·),
this inequality is clearly violated. Thus, positive assortative matching again is the only
stable matching. 
ProofofProposition3. TheaimisagaintoapplytheresultsofMailath(1987).FixS(z),
given the two exogenous distributions G(z) and H(s). Then, from the exogenous partial
derivatives given in (10), one can integrate using formula (11) to obtain w(z, S(z), x)
as a smooth increasing function [z, ¯ z] × R  → R (on integrability, see, for example,
Varian 1992, pp. 483-484). Given this wage function, a worker of perceived type ˆ z will
have utility U = w(ˆ z, S(ˆ z),x) − c(z,x). In a symmetric equilibrium, the lowest-type
worker has a match s and therefore should choose x to maximize U(z,w(z,s,x),x),
thatischoose T(z),whichconﬁrmstheboundarycondition.Furthermore,deﬁneutility
function V(·)a sV(z, ˆ z,x) = w(ˆ z, S(ˆ z),x) − c(z,x). Then it is easy to verify that our
assumptions on c(·) and π(·) imply Mailath’s (1987, p. 1352) conditions (1)–(5) on V.
In particular, note that V2 = wz = πz > 0, V13 =− czx > 0 and that V3 = πx − cx.
Mailath’scondition(4)requiresthatV3(z,z,x)=0hasauniquesolution.Ifπx >0then
this follows from the assumptions that πxx ≤ 0, and the assumption that c is convex
in x.16 However, if πx = 0 then V3(z, z, x) < 0 and T(z) = 0. But as established in
16. Mailath also assumes that ∂V/∂ˆ z is bounded above (see the previous footnote). This here is ensured
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the proof of Proposition 1, it is easy to adapt Mailath’s proofs to this slightly different
case. Existence of an incentive compatible signaling equilibrium then follows from
Theorems 1 and 2 of Mailath. It is then easy to adapt the proof of Proposition 1 and
Proposition 3 of Mailath (1987, p. 1362) to show that x(z) > T(z)o n( z, ¯ z).
Finally, to show that workers are worse off in equilibrium than under privately
optimal investment, denote U(z) = w(z, S(z), x(z)) − c(z, x(z)) and UT(z) = w(z,
S(z), T(z)) − c(z, T(z)) to be equilibrium utility and utility under privately optimal
investment T(z) respectively. Since T(z) maximizes a worker’s utility given the wage
schedule w(z, x) as deﬁned in (11) and x(z) > N(z) for all z ∈ (z, ¯ z), the result
follows. 
ProofofLemma2. TheﬁrstclaimfollowsassinceH(·)isastrictlyincreasingfunction
so is H−1(·). Therefore, if for any z, GA(z) < GB(z) then SA(z) < SB(z). For the second
claim note that if HB > st HA, then we have HA(s) > HB(s) for all s ∈ (s, ¯ s). This
implies that if G(z) = HA(s−) = HB(s+), then s+ > s−. But then s− = H−1
A (G(z)) <
s+ = H−1
B (G(z)). Finally, S (z) = G (z)/H (S(z)), thus given our assumption that if GA
> st GB then G 
A(z) < G 
B(z), it clearly follows that S 
A(z) < S 
B(z), and similarly if
HB > stHA. 
Proof of Proposition 4. The function U(z) is continuously differentiable because
x(z) and S(z) are continuously differentiable. Given that the boundary condition
x(z) = N(z) is the same in any equilibrium, we have UA(z) = UB(z). In equilibrium,
x(z) > N(z) (except at z). It then follows from assumption (v) that Ux(z, S(z), x(z)) =
bx(z, S(z), x(z)) − cx(z, x(z)) is strictly negative.
Note that any point where UA(z) = UB(z)o n( z, ¯ z), given that by Lemma 2 one
has SA(z) < SB(z), it must be that xA(z) < xB(z). But then as U (z) is strictly increasing
in x(z) and increasing in S(z) by assumption (iv), it must be that U 
A(z) < U 
B(z)a ta n y
point of crossing. Therefore, there can be only one crossing of UA(z)b yUB(z) and that
must be from below. We now rule out the remaining possibility that UA(z) ≥ UB(z)o n
an interval [z,z1] with z1 ≤ ¯ z. On the interior of the interval, again we have SA(z) <
SB(z) and, therefore, to make it possible that UA(z) ≥ UB(z), it must be that xA(z) <
xB(z). This implies that U 
A(z) < U 
B(z)o n( z,z1). This, together with UA(z) = UB(z)
implies UA(z) < UB(z) on that interval which is a contradiction.
Iturntoinvestment.First,asbyLemma2 S 
B(z) > S 
A(z),but xA(z) = xB(z)bythe
commonboundarycondition,then x 
B(z) > x 
A(z).So,xB(z)>xA(z)holdsimmediately
to the right of z. Suppose there is no crossing on (z, ¯ z], so that xA(¯ z) < xB(¯ z) which
implies that, as SA(¯ z) = SB(¯ z) = ¯ s, the utility for the highest type must be ranked
UA(¯ z) > UB(¯ z), which is a contradiction to our earlier result, Proposition 4. Now,
suppose xA(¯ z) = xB(¯ z), then it follows that UA(¯ z) = UB(¯ z). But as UA(z) < UB(z)o n
(z, ¯ z) then (generically) one has U 
A(¯ z) > U 
B(¯ z). For this last inequality to hold, given
SA(¯ z) = SB(¯ z), then, as U (z) is strictly increasing in x(z) by assumption (iv), it must
be that xA(¯ z) > xB(¯ z), a contradiction. Thus, xA(¯ z) > xB(¯ z). This implies one ﬁnal
result, that UA(¯ z) < UB(¯ z). 320 Journal of the European Economic Association
Proof of Proposition 5. Given the common boundary condition that xA(z) = xB(z) =
T(z) and that SA(z) = SB(z) = s, evaluating the differential equation (14) at z,w eﬁ n d
that x 
A(z) = x 
B(z). However, given Lemma 2, we have
x  










This implies that x 
A(z) < x 
B(z) immediately to the right of z and hence xA(z) < xB(z)
also holds in a neighborhood of z. Consider any possible subsequent crossing of xA(z)




cx(z,x) − πx(z, SA(z),x)
<
πz(z, SB(z),x)
cx(z,x) − πx(z, SB(z),x)
= x 
B(z)
by assumptions (c) and (d) on π and as SA(z) < SB(z)o n( z, ¯ z). Hence xA(z) cannot
cross xB(z) from below on (z, ¯ z) (generically also not at ¯ z) and thus we have xA(z) <
xB(z)o n( z, ¯ z].
Given the original deﬁnition of worker’s utility (7), the envelope theorem implies
that U (z) =− cz(z, x(z)) > 0. It has just been shown that xA(z) < xB(z) for all
z ∈ (z, ¯ z]. By assumption, it holds that czx < 0. Therefore, U 
A(z) =− cz(z, xA(z)) <
−cz(z, xB(z)) = U 
B(z) for all z ∈ (z, ¯ z). As UA(z) = UB(z) by the common boundary
condition x(z) = T(z), the result clearly follows. 
Proof of Proposition 6. The earlier Proposition 5 established that xA(z) < xB(z)o n
(z, ¯ z). This implies that the second integral on the right-hand side of the wage
equation(11)isstrictlylowerincaseAthanincaseB.ButasbyLemma2wehaveSA(z)
< SB(z)o n(z, ¯ z), the ﬁrst integral is lower by assumption (c) on π(·). Turning to wages
intermsofinvestment,orw(x),withsubstitutionfromthedifferentialequation(14)we
havew (x)=cx(γ(x),x).NotethatfromtheearlierProposition5,wehavexA(z)<xB(z)
on (z, ¯ z) with xA(z) = xB(z) = x(z). This implies that γ A(x) >γB(x)o n(x(z),xA(¯ z)).
Now, since czx < 0 by assumption, we have that w 
B(x) >w  
A(x)o n( x(z),xA(¯ z)) and
the result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 7. The concavity of U in x and the concavity of π together
ensure the ﬁrst order conditions (19) deﬁne a maximum. We have, for the lowest type,
x(z) = N(z) by Proposition 1. However, at z,a sπx > 0, for a social optimum from
(19), the lowest type should produce more than N(z). The ﬁnal result follows from
application of Proposition 4. 
Proof of Proposition 8. Existence of a unique solution T∗(z) to (21) at every level of z
follows from assumption (e) on π(·) and the convexity of c(z, x)i nx. The ﬁrst result
then follows directly from comparison of (13) and (21). The comparative static result
follows from Proposition 5. 
Proof of Proposition 9. Observe that, in the proposed equilibrium, investment levels
on the interval (N(ˆ z), ˆ x) are off the equilibrium path. Assume that if any worker
deviates and chooses x on that interval, ﬁrms believe with probability 1 that her type zHopkins Job Market Signaling of Relative Position 321
is strictly less than ˆ z. Then any deviation by any unemployed worker to any level of
x ∈ [0, ˆ x)willnotresultinajoboffer,sothereisnoincentivetomakesuchadeviation.
Deviation to a level of x above ˆ x is unproﬁtable by the deﬁnition of ˆ x. For workers of
type z ∈ [ˆ z, ¯ z], the equilibrium is the same as in the case of full employment. 
Proof of Proposition 10. The proposed equilibrium strategy x(z) and wage schedule
w(z) = w(z, S(z), x(z)) are continuous at ˆ z. Workers with ability on the interval [ˆ z, ¯ z]
play the equilibrium identiﬁed in Proposition 3. Workers with ability on the interval
[z, ˆ z) have no incentive to deviate to x(ˆ z), given the deﬁnition of T(z) and that the
resulting wage w is no higher. Deviation to x above x(ˆ z) cannot proﬁtable for a worker
with ability in [z, ˆ z) since it is not proﬁtable for a worker of ability ˆ z. 
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